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The riot is positioned by some contemporary Left theorists and activists as the harbinger 
of a future emancipatory politics. This view has 
emerged in a period of political transition in 
which traditional modes of Left organisation 
are routinely dismissed as ineffective. This paper 
examines the history of the riot in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, seeking to understand what role, 
if any, the riot might play in this country’s future.
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The current moment is widely regarded as transitional, an 
interregnum.1 There is a general consensus, on the Left at 
least, as to the nature of the difficulties we face—of the 
environment, democracy, economy, race relations. But how to 
move toward a more just and equitable society is not yet clear. 
To be in a transitional period involves engaging in reactive, 
rear-guard actions, defending previously fought gains. It also 
involves an extended dialogue between us, a search for ways 
to move forward, of asking what our shared values and goals 
might be, how we might (re)organise collectively, and how we 
might productively work with our differences.
A transitional period also involves an intensification of 
the search for actually-existing examples of alternative ways 
of being, or sites of resistance and unrest, in the hope these 
might harbour wider emancipatory possibilities.
The turn of much contemporary radical Left thought 
towards the riot is an example of this latter tendency. The 
Greek communisation grouping Blaumachen argue that ‘we 
are entering into an era of riot, which will be transitional and 
1 I am deeply indebted to the close and insightful engagement of 
Toby Boraman and Cybèle Locke with an earlier draft of this article. 
I am also very fortunate to have had input from Amanda Thomas, 
Sue Bradford, Mark Derby, Graeme Whimp, Jennifer de Saxe, and 
Eli Elinoff. Jack Foster has provided excellent (and patient) editorial 
assistance. All mistakes and omissions are mine alone.
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extremely violent’.2 Badiou suggests the mass-popular riots of 2011 indicate 
that we are witnessing a rebirth of the possibility of socialism-communism. 
In 2011 regimes were overthrown in Tunisia and Egypt by popular actions 
that were not directed by established organisations. Riots were at the 
epicentre of these movements. More recently, the populist gilet jaunes 
(yellow vest) movement against austerity in France, which began in October 
2018 and continues into 2019, has been punctuated by a series of riots and 
attendant police violence. ‘The riot’, argues Badiou, ‘is the guardian of the 
history of emancipation’ in a transitional period; it signals a ‘new figure of 
organisation and hence of politics’.3 ‘When it comes to liberty, equality and 
emancipation’, he asserts, ‘we owe everything to popular riots’. Riots stir 
people up. They show that the present is unacceptable. For Badiou, they 
have the potential to open a new political sequence, to alter our sense of 
what is possible.4
The common view of riots is of spontaneous, mindless eruptions of 
violence against private property and persons. A different approach to the 
riot is taken here, one that contextualises it within long-term economic 
dynamics and their intersection with political contestation. Here I am indebted 
to Joshua Clover’s Riot. Strike. Riot, which is a comprehensive attempt to 
theorise the riot in its contemporary context within Western societies.5
In the first section I unpack Clover’s theorisation and periodisation of 
the riot. Clover suggests that the riot was the most commonly deployed 
form of collective action in Western Europe in the pre-industrial period, only 
to be superseded by the strike in the 19th century. The riot has made a comeback 
from the late 1960s, he contends, because of the declining power of organised 
labour—a decline tied to changing racial and generational dynamics.
Has recent history witnessed a resurgence of the riot in Aotearoa New 
Zealand? I consider this question in the remainder of the article. In the 
2 Blaumachen, ‘The Transitional Phase of the Crisis: The Era of Riots,’ blaumachen.
gr, http://www.blaumachen.gr/2011/07/the-transitional-phase-of-the-crisis-the-era-of-
riots [emphasis in original].
3 Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of History (London: Verso, 2012), 41–2.
4 Badiou, The Rebirth of History, 107.
5 Joshua Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot: The New Era of Uprisings (London: Verso, 2016).
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second section I examine the little-studied history of riots in this county. 
In the third section I set this history against that of strikes and organised 
labour. Finally, in the fourth section I explore how this country’s racial 
dynamics might contribute to forms of contention other than those of the 
riot. I argue that the history of riots and strikes in this country differs, 
for the most part, from Clover’s periodisation. The riot is less prevalent in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, in part because of different racial dynamics and 
particular traditions of organisation and resistance.
While not always explicitly drawn together, two main threads run 
through the discussion of riots here: race and class. Gender is a salient 
third term, but a sustained treatment of this falls outside the scope of the 
article.6 It will be seen that the state often provokes riots and determines 
what is counted as a riot or who is branded a rioter. Further, it will be 
seen that while the riot is often spectacular—plumes of black smoke 
rising from burnt-out shop-fronts, the hooded rioter fleeing police—it is 
also something that manifests in a lower key, in what Clover suggests is a 
‘modality of life’ for populations excluded from economic opportunities: 
a low-level and constant ‘criminality’ and ‘anti-social’ logic present in 
certain underprivileged areas. My intention here is not to argue for a 
spontaneist-insurrectionist approach to politics; rather, I aim to highlight 
the importance of taking the riot’s dynamics into account when considering 
political organisation.
Conceptualising riots
The riot deserves a theory, asserts Clover, and ‘a theory of riot is a theory 
of crisis’.7 This entails an historical view of the ongoing and systemic crises 
6 But see: Fran Shor, ‘Bringing the Storm: Syndicalist Counterpublics and the 
Industrial Workers of the World in New Zealand, 1908–14,’ in On the Left: Essays 
in Socialism in New Zealand, ed. Pat Moloney and Kerry Taylor (Dunedin: Otago 
University Press, 2002); Cybèle Locke, ‘Rebel Girls and Pram-Pushing Scab-Hunters: 
Waihi “Scarlet Runners,” 1912,’ Labour History 107 (2014): 35–51.
7 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 1.
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of capital. In Clover’s periodisation, the first phase of the riot precedes the 
Industrial Revolution. He has us begin in 1347, at the English ports of the 
Hanseatic League, where we witness riots against the exportation of food 
in a time of famine. In the years that follow, riots accompany the growth 
of national and international markets, the commoditisation of agriculture, 
and enclosure of the commons. They are circulation struggles, conducted 
at the port or market, seeking to control the movement and price of 
goods. At stake is the social reproduction of individuals, households, and 
communities. Riots are concerned with issues of consumption.
The strike, in contrast, arises as a response to issues of production. The 
transition from riot to strike takes place between the late-18th and mid-19th 
centuries, in step with the entrenchment of industrial capitalism. Again, 
England is the crucible. The strike emerges from the riot. The machine-
wreckers are indicative of this shift, deploying the eruptive tactics of the riot 
against the means of industrial production.8 The strike came to distinguish 
itself as a tactic of collective action on the basis of being ‘ordered’—disciplined 
rather than chaotic, planned rather than spontaneous.9 The factory floor is the 
site of the strike. Social reproduction is still the focus of action, but now it is 
the price of labour rather than the cost of goods that is contested. The strike is 
conducted by workers acting self-consciously as workers.
The shift from strike back to riot corresponds to the changing dynamics 
of capital: the flexibilisation of labour, the ‘offshoring’ of production from 
core to peripheral states, advancements in global logistics, technological 
developments in production and communication.10 Against this backdrop, 
argues Clover, labour has been reduced to ‘defensive negotiations, compelled 
8 For a classic essay on this transition see: Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Machine-Breakers,’ 
in Uncommon People: Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1998), 5–17.
9 This is not to say that the riot disappears from the mid-19th century, but rather 
that it ceases to be the leading tactic for contentious politics; conversely, in the era of 
contemporary riots beginning in the late 1960s, the strike persists, but the riot is now 
the dominant tactic.
10 Clover uses the term ‘riot prime’ to designate the period of riot that opens from the 
late 1960s through to the present day; I will refer to this as the ‘contemporary riot’.
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to preserve the firms able to supply wages, affirming the domination of 
capital in return for its own preservation’.11  He goes so far as to assert that, 
in seeking to maintain the labour relation, the working class is caught in an 
‘affirmation trap’, ‘locked into the position of affirming its own exploitation 
under the guise of survival’.12 The communisation groups Rocamadur and 
Blaumachen share this perspective. They view the riot as a political site 
that offers ‘no ground for a revolutionary affirmation of class belonging, 
no workers’ identity or proletarian community’.13 Rather, riots reflect the 
fact that class belonging is ‘an element that is foreign to everyone’s life: the 
hostile embodiment of the dominating power of capital’.14 As with class, so 
too those who would represent its interests: 
As the representative of a political party, of a union or any other established 
institution, one cannot ‘organise’ and ‘coordinate’ the burning of the police 
offices or the sabotage of infrastructures, simply because one incarnates the 
very society that is being attacked through these practices, and that one’s 
existence as such a representative presupposes that of urban administration, 
of police control, of the cleavage between social citizens and ‘outsiders’.15 
The thinking of the riot, then, is an attempt to grapple with the changing 
dynamics of capital and the accompanying struggles.
Although the strike persisted as the most significant tactic of collective 
action well into the 1970s, the riot has become increasingly prevalent 
since the 1960s. The 1967 uprising in Detroit (coming shortly after urban 
rebellion in Newark) is a prominent example of this tendency. As noted by 
Bloom and Martin Jr: 
11 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 30.
12 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 147.
13 Rocamadur/Blaumachen, ‘The Feral Underclass Hits the Streets: On the English 
Riots and Other Ordeals,’ SIC 2 (2014): 123.
14 Leon de Mattis, ‘Comunist Measures: Thinking a Communist Horizon,’ SIC 2 
(2014): 60.
15 Zaschia Bouzarri, ‘Arson with Demands—on the Swedish Riots,’ SIC 3 (2015): 
22–23.
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Rebels not only looted but also turned to more serious insurrectionary 
tactics, such as arson and sniping. Unlike looting . . . these activities 
subjected rebels to significant risk while offering no instant material 
benefit, thus suggesting a challenge to the social order.16 
The uprising raged over five days; 552 buildings were destroyed or damaged 
by fire; 7,231 people were arrested and 43 people killed (including 
government officials).17 In step with Bloom and Martin Jr, Clover 
holds that this uprising (and others at the time) were not eruptions of 
spontaneous, mindless violence, but something that is ‘continuous with 
a larger political development’, that of the Black Power movement.18 The 
uprising’s location in Detroit makes it a signal event, as this is an early 
example of a city undergoing deindustrialisation. The city’s population 
was in steep decline by this point; economic growth had stagnated around 
1960, and the union policy of ‘last hired, first fired’ disproportionately 
impacted African-American workers.19 The Detroit riot of 1967 and the 
political and economic context in which it erupted signal the racialised 
dimension of the contemporary riot.
The notion of ‘relative surplus population’ helps contextualise this 
interplay between racism, unemployment and economic precarity, and the 
impulse to riot. Marx argued that capitalism produces a ‘relative surplus 
population’. As labour becomes more productive, and the means of 
production more efficient, there is a corresponding decline in the demand 
for labour. A portion of the population becomes ‘surplus’ relative to the 
needs of capital. They are pushed to the edge of, or even outside, the 
workforce. Their existence has a disciplinary effect on labour, as capitalists 
are able to depress wages and intensify the workload of those who remain 
employed. As Marx argues, ‘The relative surplus population is . . . the 
background against which the law of the demand and supply of labour does 
16 Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin Jr, Black against Empire: The History and Politics 
of the Black Panther Party (Berkely CA: Univesity of California Press, 2013), 87.
17 Bloom and Martin Jr, Black against Empire, 87.
18 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 120.
19 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 161.
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its work’.20 While the surplus population is not immediately required by 
capital in the workforce, it is of great importance to capitalists as it allows 
them to increase the surplus value extracted from the work of others. The 
surplus population is not homogenous. It comprises those whose skills are 
obsolete or whose bodies have been degraded through hard graft as well as 
the homeless, precarious part-time workers, migrant workers, orphans, and 
the demoralised, among others.21
Clover highlights the growth of the surplus population since the late 
1960s as a key element in the ascendency of the riot as a collective tactic: 
‘The riot is . . . a reckoning with idled capacities’; there is a ‘stagnant surplus 
population’ that is ‘chronically outside the formal wage’ and ‘earning less 
than subsistence amounts’.22 Others also highlight this tendency and its 
entwinement with the riot. Tyler suggests that neoliberalism produces large 
numbers of ‘“failed people” marginalised by, excluded, or disqualified from, 
the social body’.23 Or, in Žižek’s formulation, the riot is, ‘at its most radical, 
a conflict between non-society and society, between those who have nothing 
to lose and those who have everything to lose’.24 The riot provides a means 
of thinking the place of ‘surplus populations’ in relation to the state and 
capital, and of what the resistance of such populations might entail.
Within the category of surplus population, as applied to the 
contemporary situation, Clover suggests there is a ‘unity of the excluded 
and indebted’, encompassing class and race and their intersection.25 The 
contemporary riot, he argues, has two sources: ‘One . . . arises from 
youth discovering that the routes that once promised a minimally formal 
integration into the economy are now foreclosed. The other arises from 
20 Karl Marx, Capital, volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990), 792.
21 Marx, Capital, vol. I, 794–797.
22 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 155, 156.
23 Imogen Tyler, Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal 
Britain (London: Zed, 2013), 198.
24 Slavoj Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (London: Verso, 2012), 60 
[emphasis in original].
25 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 157 [emphasis in original].
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racialised surplus populations and the violent state management thereof ’.26 
In recent years, examples of the former include: student struggles in 
London in 2010, which included occupations and the sacking of a Tory 
headquarters; a series of university occupations in 2009–2010 across 
California, which met with militarised repression; Occupy Oakland in 
2011; and the Chilean student struggles of 2011–2013. Examples of the 
latter in recent years include: Sydney in 2004, in response to the death of 
Thomas Hickey during a police pursuit; Paris in 2005, following the deaths 
of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré while fleeing police; Oakland in 2009, 
following the police murder of Oscar Grant; the Tottenham riots of 2011, 
after the police killing of Mark Duggan; and the 2014 Ferguson riots, after 
the shooting of Michael Brown. These riots are indicative of a period where 
the ‘Keynesian compromise’ between capital and the state that characterised 
the three decades following the Second World War has collapsed—a 
compromise in which the state stabilised the economy in times of crisis, 
provided comprehensive welfare, and supported full employment, while 
capital, for its part, provided stable employment conditions and relatively 
high wages. Following the dissolution of this compromise the repression of 
racialised populations has intensified. Today, Clover argues, we have ‘police 
occupation of excluded communities. Police and riot . . . presuppose each other’.27
While the above examples are clearly riotous, when is a riot no longer a 
riot? Clover argues for an expansive view, one that encompasses the notion 
of riot as ‘social modality’. Here his thinking is informed by the perceived 
‘continuity between Black Power and riot’ in the context of the United 
States’ turbulent 1960s: ‘Negroes are blackness is riot. At least in 1968. 
Insofar as riot is a category recognised by state, law, and market, blacks 
coming down the street will always be a riot, or the moment before, or the 
moment after’.28 ‘Riot as social modality’ refers to a situation in which an 
 
 
26 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 180.
27 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 180.
28 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 120, 122.
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aggrieved group’s desire for collective action must pass through the riot to 
find expression. It is the reserve of
a collective population rendered surplus and forced to confront the 
problem of reproduction in the marketplace rather than in the formal 
wage—in this situation, any gathering on the corner, in the street, in the 
square can be understood as a riot. . . . [It] is hard to tell when and where 
the riot starts and ends.29 
The external viewer, for whom ‘blackness is riot’, projects ‘riot’ onto surplus 
populations, coding their struggles for social reproduction as riotous. In 
conceptualising the riot in this broader sense, as a ‘social modality’, Clover 
offers a means of thinking beyond the spectacular dimension of the riot 
towards the mundane, day-to-day experiences of surplus populations 
excluded from economic and political opportunities.
Clover argues that riots tend to divide into two impulses shortly after 
their irruption. The first is the movement towards populism—the path 
of political respectability that leads to the electoral arena—with the riot 
transformed into a demand that can be satisfied by the current order. The 
second impulse is the riot as ‘something beyond or before communication’—
characterised by immediate practicalities: ‘looting, controlling space, and 
destroying property understood to constitute the rioters’ exclusion from 
the world they see always before them and which they may not enter’.30
Since the era of the Civil Rights movement in the United States, the 
first path has most been the most frequently travelled. Today, the growing 
ranks of the surplus population confront a state increasingly unable to meet 
their demands; correspondingly, the state is ever more punitive. It is to 
the second, incommunicable, impulse that Clover would have us turn to 
appreciate the political potential of the riot—a potential that stems from its 
proximity to the commune. As Clover writes, ‘If the square and the street 
have been the places of [the contemporary riot], they both open onto the 
commune. The commune, however, is not a place . . . it is instead a social 
29 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 123.
30 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 185.
TAYLOR | RIOTS & STRIKES |
| COUNTERFUTURES 784 
relation, a political form, an event’.31 The potential of the riot lies not in what 
it immediately is, but in what it might become: an impulse that opens onto 
non-capitalist forms of social reproduction. The riot is a politics of becoming.
To summarise, Clover argues that the increased frequency of the riot 
in contemporary Western societies needs to be thought in conjunction 
with the changing dynamics of capitalism since the 1970s. The riot is a 
struggle arising from frustrations around the capacity of individuals and 
communities to reproduce themselves (physically and/or subjectively) in 
the sphere of consumption. This takes place against the backdrop of the 
declining capacity (or willingness) of the state to ameliorate the privations 
capital visits upon large swathes of the population. The riot is chiefly the 
recourse of racialised ‘surplus populations’, but also of youth and students 
whose aspirations are thwarted by diminishing opportunities. The riot is 
often sparked by state violence, and takes its spectacular form in looting, 
battles with the police, and the destruction of private property. It is also, 
Clover suggests, a ‘modality of life’ for criminalised, racialised, surplus 
populations who do not have recourse to such forms of collective action as 
the strike. The riot’s political potential lies in its capacity to open new forms 
of collective being other than those offered by capital. Within the riot lies 
the possibility of the commune. Is this possibility applicable to Aotearoa 
New Zealand today? To begin answering this question, I turn to the history 
of the riot in this country.
The riot
To contextualise the riot in Aotearoa New Zealand, it is useful to begin 
with a broad-brush account of economic development in this country. 
Early colonial capitalism was marked by a brutal phase of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ in the 19th century that forcefully separated Māori from 
31 Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot, 187. In Revolting Subjects, Tyler notes that those 
participating in the 2011 Tottenham riots frequently reported that a sense of ‘unity’ 
developed during the riots. 
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their land, leaving no alternative but to engage in waged labour.32 The 
economy was predominately orientated toward the agricultural sector and 
the extraction of primary resources, but an industrial base began to form 
in urban centres in the late-19th century. As with other countries, the New 
Zealand economy was subject to various booms and busts, including the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. 
After the Second World War the country experienced a ‘long boom’, 
stretching from 1945 to 1973. This included the largest expansion of 
productivity in the country’s history coupled with significant technological 
advances; it was a time of full male employment and rising standards of 
living.33 The long boom gave way to a ‘long depression’ that began with 
the world recession in 1974. This was marked, among other things, by 
economic stagnation, balance of payments deficits, declining profitability, 
high unemployment, and plateauing growth in real wages.34 In response 
to this, and in step with international trends, there has been an increased 
emphasis on finance, insurance, and real estate as drivers of wealth 
creation—all of which depend on access to cheap credit and increased 
levels of debt.35 
Important here has been a shift from the ‘Keynesian’ model of state 
management to a neoliberal one. The former involved a compact between 
labour, capital, and the state, with a commitment by the state to full 
employment and an expansive welfare regime. The neoliberal state has 
abandoned any commitment to full employment in favour of managing 
inflation. State assets have been privatised where possible. Those remaining 
in public ownership (partial or otherwise) are expected to perform as 
32 Evan Poata-Smith, ‘The Political Economy of Inequality between Maori and 
Pakeha,’ in The Political Economy of New Zealand, ed. Chris Rudd and Brian Roper 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 160–179.
33 Brian Roper, Prosperity for All? Economic, Social and Political Change in New 
Zealand since 1935 (Southbank: Thomson/Dunmore Press, 2005).
34 Brian Roper, ‘The End of the Golden Weather: New Zealand’s Economic Crisis,’ 
in State and Economy in New Zealand, ed. Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 1–25.
35 Jane Kelsey, The FIRE Economy (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2015).
TAYLOR | RIOTS & STRIKES |
| COUNTERFUTURES 786 
profit-making enterprises. Economic growth recovered from the 1990s 
as neoliberal reforms became embedded. However, the benefits of this 
recovery were not evenly distributed, with levels of inequality deepening 
dramatically from this time.36 The notion of the ‘public good’ has all but 
disappeared. The country’s remaining public services are begrudgingly 
doled out, with recipients routinely belittled and misled as to their legal 
entitlements and subject to increasingly punitive measures.37 As I discuss 
in more detail later, this country also has populations that are ‘surplus’ to 
capital’s requirements.
Historical riots 
An early instance of riot in Aotearoa New Zealand occurred in Nelson in 
1843, when the superintendent of public works was assaulted. The victim 
held that ‘a secret union does exist among them [the local workmen] in the 
proportion of five to one, for resisting all rules which may not be agreeable 
to themselves’.38 Other early examples occurred in southern goldmining 
areas. Religious sectarianism fuelled ‘the Battle of Addison’s Flat’ in Otago 
on 3 April 1868, in which 200 men—Protestant versus Catholic—waged 
a ‘pitched battle’.39 The racism of 200 European miners was the cause of 
another riot, in which a Chinese miners’ camp was destroyed in Okarito 
in 1871.40 As underlined by these latter two examples, riots are not always 
restricted to issues immediately concerned with social reproduction, nor will 
they automatically dovetail with left-wing concerns. However, the following 
discussion primarily examines riots with anti-capitalist or emancipatory 
36 Max Rashbrooke, ed. Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis (Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books, 2013).
37 Kelsey, The FIRE Economy.
38 Cited in Bert Roth and Janny Hammond, Toil and Trouble: The Struggle for a 
Better Life in New Zealand (Auckland: Methuen, 1981), 14.
39 Kevin Baker, Mutiny, Terrorism, Riots and Murder: A History of Sedition in 
Australia and New Zealand (Kenthurst NSW: Rosenberg, 2006), 62–63.
40 Baker, Mutiny, Terrorism, Riots and Murder.
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potential springing from discontent with capitalism and/or racism.41 
The early 20th century witnessed two industrial strikes that morphed 
into riots. In 1912 a sustained miners’ strike in Waihi, widely reported at 
the time as the ‘Waihi Riot’, reached a bloody climax when police and non-
union workers attacked a union hall where strikers were taking refuge.42 A 
policeman was shot in the stomach, a non-union worker in the knee. The 
unionist Fred Evans, who is believed to have fired the shots, later died of 
injuries sustained in a police beating, becoming a martyr for the cause. 
A push began in 1913 for a general strike. In late October striking 
members of the watersiders’ union in Wellington were confronted by 
mounted special constables. A riot ensued. It flared and abated over a 
period of six days,43 prompting Sir Joseph Ward, leader of the opposition, 
to compare the situation to ‘a system of Mexican revolt and civil war’.44 The 
police read the riot act to protestors to prevent them storming parliament 
buildings and granting police the right to fire on those assembled.45 Naval 
troops appeared on the streets of Wellington with bayonets fixed to their 
rifles; machine guns were installed at strategic locations. The unrest in 
Wellington was quelled only to resurface shortly after in Auckland, where 
workers heeded the call from the International Workers of the World 
(IWW) to shut down the city on 8 November.46 Having learned hard 
lessons in Wellington, the police response in Auckland avoided provoking 
violence.47 The ranks of those protesting dwindled, and this sequence of 
41 This article aims to give a broad overview of riots in the country. Accordingly, the 
discussion is restricted, for the most part, to instances of riot that have already been 
well documented. It should be noted, however, that the existing scholastic record is partial 
and fragmentary. A comprehensive study of riots in this country remains to be written.
42 See, for instance, ‘The Waihi Riot,’ Auckland Star, 7 December 1912.
43 Baker, Mutiny, Terrorism, Riots and Murder.
44 As cited in Herbert Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present 
(Wellington: Reed, 1973), 38. 
45 Mark Derby, personal communication with the author.
46 Shor, ‘Bringing the Storm,’ 69.
47 Graeme Dunstall, ‘Governments, the Police and the Left, 1912–51,’ in On the 
Left: Essays in Socialism in New Zealand, ed. Pat Moloney and Kerry Taylor (Dunedin: 
Otago University Press, 2002).
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radical labour waned.
The next round of radical unrest in which riots played a part occurred 
during the Great Depression in 1932. The first was in Dunedin on 9 
January, when a procession of the unemployed were refused their demand 
for relief. They stormed a local grocery store but were unable to breach the 
line of police already assembled there.48 A large riot took place in Auckland 
on 14 April. Postal workers organised a public meeting and demonstration 
to protest a 10-percent salary cut. Thousands of unemployed workers joined 
the procession as it made its way up Queen Street.49 They were met with a 
strong show of police force. James Edwards, the leader of the unemployed 
movement, sought to address the crowd only to be struck down from behind 
by a blow from a police officer’s baton. Edwards recounts what followed:
Now the mob was infuriated. . . . I staggered to the balustrade to try and 
address the crowd. By this time the police had arrived in force and were 
wielding their batons against the demonstrators and driving them back 
from the town hall doors, and within seconds the crowd in their thousands 
had become a frenzied leaderless mob. Whatever I said was drowned in the 
tumult and uproar and all I could see through the blood that was blinding 
me, from the wound on my head, was the dark bodies of my fellow men 
in violent conflict as police and demonstrator encountered one another.50
The ensuing riot traversed the length of Queen Street. Naval troops with 
fixed bayonets quelled the unrest the following day. Then, on 10 May 
in Wellington protestors assembled to contest hastily passed legislation 
granting police greater powers for dispersing riots. Shortly thereafter a riot 
broke out, leaving a trail of broken glass and looted stores stretching along 
Lambton Quay and up Willis and Manners streets.51 In the same period 
a tramways strike in Christchurch ‘resulted in unprecedented scenes of 
48 James Edwards, Riot 1932 (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1974).
49 Edwards, Riot 1932, 2.
50 As cited in Edwards, Riot 1932, 2.
51 Baker, Mutiny, Terrorism, Riots and Murder; Edwards, Riot 1932.
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violence and disorder’.52
Racism sparked the next round of significant rioting in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. US servicemen, based north of Wellington during the Second 
World War, encountered New Zealand soldiers in Wellington city. Tensions 
had been running high in 1943, in no small part because of the US troops’ 
popularity with local women. A riot was sparked by US soldiers objecting 
to drinking in the same club as Māori. Over 1,000 soldiers were involved in 
what became known as ‘The Battle of Manners Street’. Smaller skirmishes 
followed—including a brawl between Māori civilians and US servicemen 
near the US camp in Otaki.53
Prisons have also been sites of riot in Aotearoa New Zealand. There were 
significant riots at Mt Eden and Paparua prisons in 1965.54 The frequency 
of prison riots increased in the heated international political climate of the 
1960s and 1970s, fuelled in no small part by the rise of Black Power in the 
US. As Newbold writes: 
Starting in North America, prisoners, many of them black, began to 
see themselves as victims of state oppression, a feeling enhanced by the 
beatings and arrests of political agitators. This awareness was accompanied 
by a spate of prison riots, many of them organised by state and national 
prisoners’ unions.55
These riots escalated in the years 1968–1972. A similar pattern could be 
seen in New Zealand prisons, where inmates were politicised by events 
in the US and elsewhere. Riots occurred in Paremoremo, Mt Eden, Mt 
Crawford, and Paparua over the years 1969–1975. The causes varied: 
52 Erik Olssen, ‘The New Zealand Labour Movement, 1920–40,’ in Common 
Cause: Essays in Australian and New Zealand Labour History, ed. Eric Fry (Sydney 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 20.
53 Baker, Mutiny, Terrorism, Riots and Murder.
54 Greg Newbold, The Problem of Prisons: Corrections Reform in New Zealand since 
1840 (Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 2007).
55 Newbold, The Problem of Prisons, 70–71.
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overcrowding, lengthy deprivation, poor treatment.56 The following years 
saw more prison riots—Paremoremo 1998, Spring Hill 2016—but with 
less frequency. With the prison population in Aotearoa New Zealand 
disproportionately tilted toward Māori and Pasifika,57 it can be argued 
there is a racialised dimension to these events.
A more specifically racialised ‘riot’ took place in 1979 with the 
infamous ‘haka party’ at the University of Auckland. Engineering students 
had long undertaken a drunken mock haka at their annual capping 
celebration. Donning grass skirts, and painting obscenities on their bodies, 
the engineering students performed a haka laced with racist epithets 
directed at Māori. Despite requests from Māori students for it to stop, 
the practice continued. In 1979 a group of Māori and Pasifika students, 
including members of He Taua (the Māori People’s Liberation Movement 
of Aotearoa), confronted the engineering students as they prepared for 
their haka party, asking that the grass skirts be removed. A scuffle broke 
out. Eleven members of He Taua were subsequently arrested and charged 
with rioting.58 This incident does not qualify as a riot in the commonsense 
notion of this term—a mass of bodies in the streets. What it does underline, 
however, is the leeway afforded the legal system in being able to designate 
an event a ‘riot’, an effective way of denigrating and delegitimising those 
labelled ‘rioter’ in the eyes of the public.59
The best known example of the state going on riot-footing—again with 
race a central issue—is its response to protests against the 1981 Springbok 
tour. History of opposition to New Zealand’s sporting contact with the 
South African rugby team, the Springboks, stretches back to 1921, but the 
intensity and momentum of these protests increased through the 1960s 
56 Newbold, The Problem of Prisons, 71.
57 Gary Raumati Hook, ‘The Criminalization of Māori and Pacific Islanders under 
the Domestic Violence Act 1995,’ MAI Review, no. 3 (2009); Robert Webb, ‘Māori, 
Pacific Peoples and the Social Construction of Crime Statistics,’ MAI Review, no. 3 (2009).
58 Aroha Harris, Hīkoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest (Wellington: Huia, 2004).
59 The New Zealand Crimes Act, 1961, section 87, holds that ‘A riot is a group of 6 
or more persons who, acting together, are using violence against persons or property to 
the alarm of persons in the neighbourhood of that group’.
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into the 1970s. This cycle of protest reached its climax with ‘The Tour’ of 
1981.60 Over an eight-week period 150,000 people attended protests in 28 
centres. Protestors stormed test-match pitches and met with violence from 
rugby fans. Riot police were deployed to quell the protests, intensifying the 
situation and leading to ‘running battles between protestors, the police and 
rugby fans’. As Harris argues, it appeared ‘as if New Zealand was on the 
brink of civil war’.61 Again, the protests were not riots in-themselves, but 
the state response effectively made them so.
A spectacular manifestation of discontent occurred with the Queen 
Street riot of 1984. The setting was an end-of-school rock concert in 
Auckland’s Aotea Square, attended by approximately 10,000. A power cut 
interrupted the music and drunken youths on a balcony began urinating on 
those below. Bottles were thrown in retaliation, police intervened, skirmishes 
broke out. The concert was ordered to stop, and riot police arrived to direct 
the crowd down Queen Street. There were further confrontations between 
the police and members of the crowd. A riot soon followed.62 As recounted 
by one young participant:
People started throwing bottles at the stage and soon there were bottles 
everywhere, smashing on the concrete of Aotea Square, all around us. It 
rained bottles. . . . Crowds surged down Queen Street, breaking windows 
and looting shops. Later we caught the bus home and the Police stopped 
the bus, got on and arrested some people with stolen stuff. The whole day 
was actually pretty cool, scary but the violence wasn’t directed so much at 
people (at least in my experience) as property.63
Many commentators at the time did not look past the spectacular dimension 
of the riot, seeing only a spontaneous event with no underlying causes: it 
60 Trevor Richards, Dancing on Our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and 
Racism (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1999).
61 Harris, Hīkoi, 108.
62 Tony Mitchell, ‘On Black Friday: Another Look at the Queen Street Riot,’ New 
Zealand Journal of Media Studies 13, no. 2 (2012), 130–151.
63 As cited in Mitchell, ‘On Black Friday,’ 130.
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was ‘mob hysteria’, ‘misuse of alcohol’, and so on.64 Witnesses to the event, 
however, lay the blame for the escalating situation at the feet of the police. 
Mitchell, in his analysis of the riot, draws the following conclusion:
Evidence appears that there was a subcultural element involved in the 
riots, especially gangs, punks and street kids, together with a widespread 
animosity towards aggressive police tactics. Unemployment seems less of a 
direct causal issue, although racial tensions were definitely a feature in the 
arrests and in descriptions of the riots.65
We are, here, firmly situated in the terrain of the contemporary riot. Mitchell 
notes the racialised dimension of the riot, with Māori and Pasifika at the 
forefront of skirmishes with the police. The presence of street kids was also a 
factor, a symptom of the wider economic crisis faced by the country. 
Ranginui Walker, writing in the aftermath of the riot, and against the 
backdrop of proleterianisation, poverty, the urbanisation of Māori, and the 
loss of traditional sources of community, makes the following observation: 
If both parents are forced to work there are often no elders at home to meet 
the children and care for them. They spill out on the cities to become street 
kids and to search for an identity in gangs. Thus the urban milieu itself 
spawned the brown proletariat which has generated so much paranoia and 
occupied considerable media space in the last ten years. Because of their 
deep sense of alienation these young people do not share in the social and 
cultural aspirations of middle New Zealand. Add to that their often voiced 
claim of police harassment and victimisation, and they were a ready-made 
constituency waiting for a riot to happen, as it did on 7 December 1984.66 
The Queen Street riot of 1984 indicates the interrelation of race, economic 
downturn and precarity, surplus population growth, and the advent of 
the riot. As Clover argues, there are two sources of the contemporary riot: 
64 Mitchell, ‘On Black Friday.’
65 Mitchell, ‘On Black Friday,’ 149.
66 Ranginui Walker, Ngā Tau Tohetohe: Years of Anger (Auckland: Penguin, 1987), 154–155.
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excluded and disaffected youth and racialised populations. In the case of 
the Queen Street riot of 1984 these categories overlapped. 
There have also been a number of instances of student riots in Dunedin 
since the 1990s, with drunkenness routinely cited by media as the cause. In 
1990, the Otago Daily Times tells us, a riot took place when ‘1500 drunken 
students caused havoc . . . after they upturned cars, lit street fires and pelted 
police with bottles and bricks’.67 A different perspective on the event was 
offered by the Otago University Students’ Association, which suggest that 
the riot ‘may well be symptomatic of the increased pressures University 
life places upon students’, including ‘a very poor standard of living’.68 
This riot took place against the backdrop of changing tertiary education 
climate. The Fourth Labour Government imposed a uniform fee on tertiary 
students in 1989, universities began incrementally raising their fees, and 
student allowances ceased to be universal from 1991, with student loans 
introduced.69 Student indebtedness and impoverishment increased steadily 
from this point.
A more explicitly political event took place at Otago University in 
1993. A student rally protesting a rise in student fees and related grievances 
was held outside the registry building to coincide with a meeting of the 
University Council. Students surrounded the building once the council 
meeting was underway and police intervened. As recounted by a student 
participant: 
At some point the doors were thrown open and police officers in riot 
gear jumped over and onto seated students. . . .  What is very clear is a 
police officer moving his way down the line of people towards me, pulling 
67 ‘1990: Cars overturned, sofa burnt, as students riot,’ Otago Daily Times, 2 
February 2012, https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/1990-cars-overturned-sofa-
burnt-students-riot
68 Cited in ‘A brief history of Dunedin’s wildest student riots,’ Stuff, 28 April 2019, 
https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/28-04-2019/a-brief-history-of-dunedins-wildest-
student-riots/
69 Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment (Auckland: Auckland University Press 
& Bridget Williams Books, 1997).
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people out and hitting them if they didn’t move. He reached me and yelled 
something, and pulled at my shirt, ripping it. He then swung his long 
baton and hit me on the back of the neck. . . . Initially I was stunned, and 
wandered aimlessly for some seconds. Eventually I went to the aid of a 
woman in a pink top who was crouched over crying near the large flower-
pots. She said that a police officer had kneed her in the back and that she 
was having trouble breathing. Next thing I knew I was flat on my front. 
Standing up, I turned around to see a police officer in a white shirt, and I 
felt a pain in my lower back.70
Another student recounts how this rough treatment by the university and 
police radicalised students, triggering an occupation of the registry in Otago 
in 1995 and Auckland in 1996.71 In the 1993 event police provocation had 
created a riotous situation, and the subsequent labelling of the event as a 
‘student riot’ worked to undermine public support for victims of police 
brutality.
Riots became an annual feature of Dunedin student life in the years 
2006–2009. These riots often coincided with the ‘Undie 500’, a rally 
in which students from Canterbury drove elaborately decorated cars to 
Dunedin, with numerous stops at bars on the way. The event was cancelled 
in 2009, following two nights of rioting in the city, which culminated in 
police ‘facing off against a mob of about 600 people’.72 Inspector Dave 
Campbell is quoted as saying that ‘The event has once again shown that 
when large numbers of young adults gather and drink to excess mass 
disorder is inevitable’—a commonsense view found throughout reportage 
on the riots.73 While significant primary research is needed to draw any sharp 
conclusions between these riots and students’ political-economic context, 
70 Kyle Matthews, ‘September 28th 1993’ (Hons dissertation, Otago University, 
2000), 14. 
71 Cybèle Locke, e-mail message to author, 5 March 2019. This point is also argued 
by Matthews, ‘September 28th 1993.’
72 ‘Undie 500: Rioting in Dunedin for second night,’ New Zealand Herald, 
13 September 2009, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1&objectid=10596992 
73 ‘Undie 500: Rioting in Dunedin for second night.’
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such events conform with the trends identified in Clover’s arguments.     
The above history of riots is partial, but it does provide a sense of the 
place of the riot in this country. It appears the riot is not a common event 
and has not increased in frequency or intensity in recent history. The most 
‘notable’ riots—in terms of numbers involved and the scale of destruction 
of private property—fall relatively evenly across the period surveyed. Four 
broad categories of riot are identifiable: riots with an explicit economic 
dimension, as when strikes or assemblies of the unemployed became riotous 
(often through police provocation) and/or when looting was pronounced 
(examples of which include the Depression-era riots and the Queen Street 
riot of 1984); protest events that were treated as and/or branded as riots by 
the state (such as the haka party incident or the Springbok tour protests); 
riots directly sparked by racism (the least frequent); and riots carried 
out by disaffected youth (Queen Street 1984 and Dunedin students in 
1990 and 2006–2009). That this last type of riot appears to be the most 
common in the contemporary period suggests some affinities with Clover’s 
periodisation, but the particularities of Aotearoa New Zealand cut against 
a wholesale adoption of his model for explaining riots here.74 Nevertheless, 
Clover’s work provides a useful provocation for thinking through the place 
of the riot in relation to ‘organised’ forms of collective action. 
The strike is set against the riot in Clover’s work, with the latter waxing 
as the former wanes. Might the history of the strike and organised labour in 
this country provide some answers as to why the riot is less prevalent here 
than in other Western states?  
The strike and unions 
To understand the history of the strike in Aotearoa New Zealand it is useful 
to track the changing dynamics of unionism in this country, including the 
ebb and flow of militant unionism and its correlation with strike waves.
74 Another issue being the different timeframe of the entrenchment of capitalism 
and its industrial base.
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For the most part the strike was not a prevalent feature here in the 
19th century. The first recorded strike was conducted by Māori in the Bay 
of Islands in 1821 following a wage dispute; the first Pākehā strike was in 
New Plymouth in 1841.75 Most early strikes took place on public works. A 
common goal was the introduction and defence of the eight-hour working 
day—a win which, in itself, signalled the relative strength of labour in the 
country at the time. While slow to take root, unionism grew rapidly. In 
1888 there were approximately 3,000 union members in the country; by 
late 1890 it was claimed that there were 63,000.76 As elsewhere, workers 
in this country were exposed to socialist and communist ideas and were 
coming to self-consciously identify as members of a class with common 
interests.77 The first true test of this worker militancy was the 1890 
maritime strike, a nationwide and trans-Tasman strike. Within Aotearoa 
New Zealand it involved 8,000 workers across a range of occupations. 
Middle class opinion turned against the workers, and employers effectively 
organised to undercut the unions.78 The strike was defeated after 77 days.
The labour movement took a parliamentary-political turn in the wake 
of the strike, forming an alliance with the Liberal Party. An outcome of 
the alliance, once the Liberals took power, was the introduction of the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. This act compelled 
employers to engage in arbitration with employees to settle disputes, with 
a national Arbitration Court overseeing the process. It was optional for 
unions as to whether they signed up to the act. Those that did were no 
longer permitted to strike. The act provided workers with an opportunity 
to rebuild the movement following the defeat of the maritime strike. 
For employers ‘it offered the alluring prospect of a land free of strikes’.79 
75 Roth and Hammond, Toil and Trouble.
76 Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand. Although, Roth notes, this figure is likely 
exaggerated.
77 Erik Olssen and Clyde Griffen, An Accidental Utopia? Social Mobility & the 
Foundations of an Egalitarian Society, 1880–1940 (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 
2011); Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand.
78 Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand, 15.
79 Olssen, ‘The New Zealand Labour Movement, 1880–1920.’
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Labour discontent with the Liberal Government grew in the early 20th 
century. In 1906 Auckland tram workers undertook the first strike action 
by a registered union in defiance of the Arbitration Court. The strike was 
successful and emboldened other unions.80 A radical period of working 
class organisation followed. 
On the back of a successful miners’ strike in Blackball in early 1908, 
the New Zealand Federation of Labour—commonly known as the ‘Red 
Feds’—formed to challenge the arbitration system. The Red Feds were 
militant, affirming the primacy of class struggle. Composed from an 
affiliation of miners’, watersiders’, shearers’, labourers’, and other unions 
for workers in ‘unskilled’ sectors, the Red Feds represented a different body 
of workers than the more conservative craft unions. By 1912 its ranks 
contained a quarter of the country’s organised workers.81 In the same period 
the Social Democratic Party (a forerunner of the Labour Party) formed on 
the platform of an independent socialist politics. The IWW gained traction 
at this point too—advocating for a radical, syndicalist, and direct-action 
approach to class conflict.82 The Red Feds’ publication, the Maoriland 
Worker, carried material from IWW agitators and other radical writers. 
With a circulation of 8,500 at this time, it contributed to a vibrant debate in 
far-left tactics and thought. An economic downturn in 1909 saw declining 
living standards and rising unemployment, further fuelling radicalism. The 
militant turn taken by labour found expression in the events of Waihi in 
1912, culminating in a general strike in 1913 organised by the Red Feds. 
The forceful crushing of the general strike broke the power of the Red Feds, 
and militant unionism was once again derailed across the country.
After quelling the 1913 strike the conservative prime minister William 
Massey implemented a raft of anti-union legislation, forcing organised 
labour away from industrial action and back down the path of parliamentary 
80 Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand.
81 Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand.
82 Shor, ‘Bringing the Storm.’
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politics.83 The Labour Party formed in 1916. By 1920 most unions had 
aligned with the party. In 1936 leading unionists, together with the 
Labour Party, organised the National Industrial Conference; an outcome 
of which was the formation of  the Federation of Labour (FoL) from an 
affiliation of unions.84 By the 1940s, suggests Olssen, the majority of the 
country’s workers thought ‘the revolution was complete’—with high wages, 
job security, free education, comprehensive free healthcare, and generous 
pensions and superannuation.85 The country’s ‘practical socialism’—a 
Keynesian state under the government of the Labour Party—was a product 
of the compromise between organised labour and capital. 
By the late 1940s, however, there was a growing restlessness within the 
labour movement. Radical elements contested the tight compact between 
the FoL and the Labour Party.86 Militant socialist unions and the Waterside 
Workers’ Union (WWU) broke with the FoL in early 1949, forming the 
rival Trade Unions Congress (TUC). The TUC advocated for industrial 
action rather than arbitration. The industrial unrest building under the 
First Labour Government (1935–1949) intensified once the First National 
Government took power in 1949 under the leadership of Sidney Holland. 
This discontent found dramatic expression in the 1951 waterfront 
dispute. The action involved 22,000 workers at its height. Initially a 
conflict concerning overtime and wages, Holland treated it as a direct 
challenge to law and order,87 and the mainstream press reported it as a 
Soviet-led ‘communist’ takeover of the waterfront.88 Public support for the 
action was low, as was that of the wider union movement (reflecting the 
dynamics of the TUC’s split from the FoL). Any support offered locked-
83 Christopher Wilkes, ‘The State as an Historical Subject: A Periodisation of State 
Formation in New Zealand,’ in State and Economy in New Zealand, ed. Brian Roper 
and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1993), 192–209.
84 Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand. 
85 Olssen, ‘The New Zealand Labour Movement, 1920–40,’ 24.
86 Olssen, ‘The New Zealand Labour Movement, 1920–40.’ 
87 Wilkes, ‘The State as an Historical Subject.’
88 Michael Bassett, Confrontation ’51: The 1951 Waterfront Dispute (Wellington: 
Reed, 1972).
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out workers and those striking in solidarity was deemed illegal—including 
providing food to the strikers’ children. The lockout held for five months 
but met with increasingly repressive practices from the state. Police violence 
was common, and the military was eventually deployed to break the 
pickets on the wharves.89 The defeat of the Waterside Workers’ Union was 
simultaneously the defeat of militant unionism in the country at this time. 
The labour movement entered a 15-year period of quiescence.90 
When the Second National Government came to power in 1960, 
Keith Holyoake, the new prime minister, spoke of how fortunate it was 
to have the FoL continuing to stand by the government’s side—as it had 
during the unrest of 1951.91 The arbitration system so faithfully upheld 
by the FoL began to face challenges in the 1960s. This reflected wider 
economic developments and changes within the arbitration system itself: 
‘Labour scarcity, changing patterns of industrialisation, new workplace 
technologies, and managerial preference for negotiating their own 
agreements all contributed to the development of a network of direct 
bargaining outside the arbitration system’.92 Better awards were secured 
outside of the arbitration system than within, emboldening unions in 
direct bargaining.
The year 1968 witnessed a turning point for industrial relations. The 
Arbitration Court, tasked with ensuring economic stability, refused to 
award a general wage order, further undermining the union movement’s 
faith in arbitration.93 Workers now pitched their organisational capacity 
89 Dick Scott, 151 Days: Official History of the Great Waterfront Lockout and 
Supporting Strikes, February 15–July 15, 1951 (Auckland: New Zealand Waterside 
Workers’ Union, 1951).
90 Tom Bramble and Sarah Heal, ‘Trade Unions,’ in The Political Economy of New 
Zealand, ed. Chris Rudd and Brian Roper (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
119–140.
91 Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand.
92 Pat Walsh, ‘From Arbitration to Bargaining: Changing State Strategies in 
Industrial Relations,’ in The Political Economy of New Zealand, ed. Chris Rudd and 
Brian Roper (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 183–201.
93 Walsh, ‘From Arbitration to Bargaining.’
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against employers. Strike rates rose dramatically. By way of comparison, 
1966 witnessed 147 strike actions involving 33,132 workers; 1976 had 543 
with 263,855 involved; 1977 had the greatest number of strikes recorded 
in the country to date, at 564; and 1979 witnessed the highest number of 
workers involved in actions, at 471,450—46.2 percent of the country’s 
labour force at the time.94 The FoL changed tactics in this period, adopting 
a more militant ‘grassroots’ approach to organising.95 It spearheaded a 
national campaign of stopwork meetings in response to the government’s 
wage freeze in 1976. In 1979 it coordinated a national one-day general 
strike after Muldoon overturned an 11-percent wage increase agreement 
between drivers and their employers.96 The 1979 General Strike is the 
largest to have taken place in the country. It was the first time blue- and 
white-collar unions acted together at a national level.97 
Neoliberalism and union decline
The increasingly militant working class attracted a ‘ruling-class counter-
offensive’ in the 1980s,98 the cruel irony being that the vehicle for this 
offensive was the Fourth Labour Government elected in 1984. Labour 
initiated a rapid series of market-driven reforms that had not been 
foreshadowed in their pre-election manifesto, taking the party’s supporters 
by surprise. A rift opened between the party and union leadership, 
bringing about ‘a deterioration in the relationship between the political 
94 Toby Boraman, ‘Merging Politics with Economics: Non-Industrial and Political 
Work Stoppage Statistics in New Zealand During the Long 1970s,’ New Zealand 
Journal of Employment Relations 41, no. 1 (2016): 64–82.
95 Cybèle Locke, Workers in the Margins: Union Radicals in Post-War New Zealand 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012).
96 Raymond Markey, ‘Troubled Times: 1967–88,’ in Unions in Common Cause: 
The New Zealand Federation of Labour 1937–88, ed. Peter Franks and Melanie Nolan 
(Wellington: Steele Roberts Aotearoa, 2011), 145–181.
97 Boraman, ‘Merging Politics with Economics.’
98 Bramble and Heal, ‘Trade Unions.’
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and industrial wings of the labour movement’.99 As Jesson argues, ‘The 
union movement was in an invidious position in the mid-1980s. It found 
itself being undermined by a Labour Government that it had spent a lot of 
time and money helping elect, and not in a strong enough position to do 
anything about it’.100 
Labour abolished compulsory arbitration in 1987. This move, along 
with other changes, aimed for a more ‘efficient’ union sector.101 While 
militant unions had previously opposed compulsory arbitration, because of 
the shifting balance of power within the economy, this change in industrial 
policy was now more suited to the interests of employers than workers. 
In this changing environment the Combined State Unions (CSU) and 
the FoL jointly pursued a corporatist approach on two fronts: building 
support within Labour Party conferences to oppose neoliberal reforms; 
and negotiating in the ‘tripartite talks’ between unions, employers, and the 
government in which non-binding wage guidelines were set.102 The FoL 
and CSU combined to form the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) in 1987 
in a bid to consolidate the union movement’s depleted resources. The CTU 
continued to pursue the conciliatory path of corporatist negotiation. 
On the employer’s side, the ‘Nissan Way’ was promoted in the late 
1980s as a system of workplace reform. It encouraged cooperation rather 
than confrontation. ‘Partnerships’ between workers and management were 
sought at the company level, with workers tasked with increasing efficiency 
in a bid to save their workplaces. Employers, predictably, saw no positive 
role for unions in this partnership.103 Employees in such workplaces were 
now caught in the ‘affirmation trap’ discussed above.
99 Jonathan Boston, ‘Wages Policy and Industrial Relations Reform,’ in The Fourth 
Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, ed. Jonathan Boston and Martin 
Holland (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), 184.
100 Bruce Jesson, Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour Government 
(Auckland: Penguin, 1989), 91.
101 Walsh, ‘From Arbitration to Bargaining,’ 193.
102 Locke, Workers in the Margins.
103 David Neilson, A Trade Union Perspective of New Zealand’s Political Economy 
(Auckland: W.I.S.E, 1993).
TAYLOR | RIOTS & STRIKES |
| COUNTERFUTURES 7102 
Rather than accept the CTU’s corporatist approach, militant working 
class unions opted to form the Trade Union Federation (TUF) in 1993. 
TUF encouraged struggle-based unionism and tried to move the CTU 
away from tripartism and workplace reform, arguing for an approach that 
would redistribute resources to low-income and unemployed people.104 
While Labour’s measures were employer-friendly, employers felt 
they did not go far enough. The decisive step in favour of employers was 
undertaken by the Fourth National Government (1990–1999) with the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA). Union membership had dropped 
significantly during the two terms of the Fourth Labour Government, 
from 63 percent of all waged and salaried workers in 1987, to 54 percent 
in 1990.105 The ECA accelerated this decline. It abolished national award 
coverage and compulsory unionism, and individual employment contracts 
replaced collective ones. Unions lost their special privileges, including their 
tax-exempt status. They were no longer guaranteed access to worksites and 
the capacity to strike legally was significantly limited.106 When strikes did 
take place in this period they were often met with police violence. For 
instance, the 1993 Astley’s Tannery strike in New Lynn, a predominantly 
Tongan workplace, was met by police wielding long batons.107 
By December 1995 union membership had fallen to 21.7 percent of 
the labour force.108 Membership rates have hovered around this rate since, 
although 2017 saw the figure drop to 17.7 percent.109 Strike rates have 
witnessed a similar fall, dropping from the highpoint of 1977 noted above. 
To continue giving a snapshot in ten-year blocks: 1987 witnessed 193 
104 Locke, Workers in the Margins.
105 Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment.
106 Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment.
107 Cybèle Locke, e-mail message to author.
108 Walsh, ‘From Arbitration to Bargaining.’
109 Union Membership Return Report 2016 (Wellington: New Zealand Companies 
Office, 2016).
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strike actions, involving 80,100 workers;110 1997 had 42, involving 7,646 
workers; and 2017 had six, involving 421 workers.111 The influence of trade 
unions on state policy has waned, with business interests taking centre 
stage.112 A dramatic upturn in strikes occurred in 2018, with upwards of 
70,000 walking off the job, including workers in health, education, service 
industries, transport, and industrial production.113 It is too early to tell if 
this is a temporary blip or a turning point for organised labour.
Contemporary approaches to unionism
Broadly speaking, two organisational approaches to unionism have been 
pursued in Aotearoa New Zealand in the wake of the ECA: the ‘partnership 
model’ and ‘social movement unionism’. Pioneered by the Public Service 
Association (PSA) in 1998, the partnership model continues in the vein of 
the CTU’s corporatist approach. The first major partnership deal between 
a union, employers, and government was signed in 2000. As summarised 
by Brookes: 
Partnership is an elastic concept. When presented to union delegates and 
activists, it is portrayed as a strategy for stronger worker participation and 
110 John Deeks and Peter Boxhall, Labour Relations in New Zealand (Auckland: 
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Department of Labour, 2004); ‘Work Stoppage Information for 2017,’ Employment 
New Zealand, https://www.employment.govt.nz/starting-employment/unions-and-
bargaining/work-stoppages/
112 Helen Delaney and Nigel Haworth, ‘Battling in a Bleak Environment: The 
New Zealand Context for Partnership,’ in Developing Positive Employment Relations: 
International Experiences of Labour Management Partnership, ed. Stewart Johnstone and 
Adrian Wilkinson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 181–205.
113 ‘Overworked and underpaid: The revival of strikes in New Zealand,’ The 
Conversation, https://theconversation.com/overworked-and-underpaid-the-revival-of-
strikes-in-new-zealand-111728
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decision making. . . . For other audiences, however, what is stressed is 
union willingness to cooperate in boosting business profitability.114 
The Fifth Labour Government was supportive of this approach. It 
introduced the Employment Relations Act (ERA) in 2000—a piece of 
legislation that the CTU were formative in developing— seeking to create 
better conditions for unions than those set by the ECA.115 It has been 
argued that ‘The minister responsible for the introduction of the ERA was 
convinced that a pluralist, voluntarist alternative based on good faith was a 
forward-looking option for a modern, diversifying economy’.116 Critics hold 
that the ERA only introduced superficial changes to industrial relations and 
did little to benefit workers.117 The Fifth Labour Government and the CTU 
were committed to working closely with employers to increase productivity. 
As one enthusiastic business commentator noted: ‘The challenge to the 
CTU and the [Labour] Government is to stand firm against some of their 
own who might prefer the sluggish safety of protectionism to the dynamic 
rewards of competition’.118 The partnership model worked, to some 
extent, for large unions like the PSA and the Engineering, Printing and 
Manufacturing Union.119 It was less favourable for unions operating in the 
precarious and ‘less-skilled’ sectors of the economy.
‘Social movement unionism’ (SMU) is an alternative approach to 
unionism, involving the following features: a grassroots approach to 
organisation within the union, with delegates and members playing key 
114 Grant Brookes, ‘Trade Unions and New Zealand’s Economic Crisis,’ Links: 
International Journal of Socialist Renewal, http://links.org.au/node/1111
115 Delaney and Haworth, ‘Battling in a Bleak Environment.’
116 Delaney and Haworth, ‘Battling in a Bleak Environment,’ 192.
117 Ian McAndrew, Alan Geare, and Fiona Edgar, ‘The Changing Landscape of 
Industrial Relations,’ in Workplace Relations in New Zealand 1976–2016, ed. Gordon 
Anderson, Alan Geare, Earling Rasmussen and Margaret Wilson (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2017).
118 Phil O’Reilly, ‘The Productivity Challenge,’ Business NZ, 2 February 2005, 
https://www.businessnz.org.nz/news-and-media/commentaries/2005/the-productivity-
challenge
119 Delaney and Haworth, ‘Battling in a Bleak Environment.’
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roles; networking and solidarity with groups outside of the union; and the 
pursuit of broader social justice aims.120 The Wellington Hotel and Hospital 
Workers’ Union pioneered this approach in Aotearoa New Zealand. In the 
late 1980s it campaigned ‘beyond the workplace for social and health changes 
that would assist working-class communities in the greater Wellington 
region’.121 The Living Wage Campaign provides a contemporary example 
of this approach. As Newman and Jess suggest, this is a campaign that 
‘places workers within their communities, that grounds them in citizenship, 
recognising social and economic influences on their lives from beyond the 
workplace. The movement aspires to a democratic project that changes 
society and not just employment arrangements in workplaces’.122
Unite Union have been at the cutting edge of this approach. With a 
youthful membership, many of whom are employed in the fast food industry 
and other precarious industries, Unite uses novel tactics to attract media 
attention and pressure employers. One of their early actions in 2005, ‘the 
world’s first Starbucks Strike’, garnered international attention. Treen, one 
of Unite’s founders and organisers, notes that their work is often as much 
about workers’ dignity as bread-and-butter issues.123 Unite has influenced 
other unions, including FIRST (Finance, Industrial, Retail, Stores, 
and Transport). FIRST often directs its actions at high-visibility targets 
such as supermarkets on main thoroughfares. Delegates play key roles in 
120 Jane Parker, ‘Reaching out for Strength Within? “Social Movment Unionism” 
in a Small Country Setting,’ Industrial Relations Journal 42, no. 4 (2011): 392–403; 
Jane Parker and Ozan Alakavunkular, ‘Social Movement Unionism as Union-Civil 
Alliances—A Democratizing Force? The New Zealand Case,’ Relations Industrielles/
Industrial Relations 73, no. 4 (2018): 784–813.
121 Cybèle Locke, ‘Building Solidarity at the Flax-Roots: Standing Committees for 
Women, Maori and Pacific Island Members Inside the Wellington Hotel and Hospital 
Workers’ Union, 1979–1989,’ Labour & Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic 
Relations of Work 25, no. 3 (2015): 170–184.
122 Annabel Newman and Carol Jess, ‘Renewing New Zealand Unions: The Service 
and Food Workers’ Union & Living Wage Aotearoa,’ Labour, Employment and Work in 
New Zealand (2015), https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/LEW/article/view/2223
123 Mike Treen, ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand: A History of the Unite Union,’ Links: 
International Journal of Socialist Renewal, http://links.org.au/node/4429
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organising actions. In contrast to the partnership model, FIRST follows a 
‘militant approach and left-of-centre frame that emphasises struggle, [and] 
is tentative about developing good relationships with employers’.124 
SMU is a more militant approach to unionism in Aotearoa New 
Zealand than the ‘partnership’ model favoured by conservative unions. The 
dynamics of these two approaches echo historical divisions in the country’s 
union movement. If SMU were to deepen as a process—becoming more 
embedded in the communities where precarious workers live—then the 
tendency toward the riot will likely remain marginal in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Considering the ever-decreasing membership of unions in this country, 
however, the gains secured through SMU appear limited at this point.
Further, the novelty of SMU should not be overstated. As Boraman 
argues, ‘many social movements and broad political currents of the . . . 
1970s influenced, and were influential within, many trade unions’.125 The 
interface between unions and extra-parliamentary activity in that period 
includes union support of Māori land-rights struggles, the anti-nuclear 
movement, and opposition to apartheid. An analysis of union publications 
in the early 1980s reveals an expansion from class-based claims-making 
to claims specific to Māori and women.126 As Locke notes, the increasing 
number of Māori union officials in the 1970s prompted change in the 
movement. This change had a cultural dimension, and it was also evident 
in the breadth of issues addressed, with many Māori unionists holding that 
economic justice was only achievable when Māori grievances over land and 
cultural dispossession were addressed.127 The movement became increasingly 
intersectional in its outlook as the 1970s drew to a close, organising around 
race, gender, and class. The tragedy is that this shift occurred as unionism 
lost ground to capital. Overall, it seems that discontent in this period 
124 Janis Bailey et al, ‘Union Power in Retail: Constrasting Cases in Australia and 
New Zealand,’ New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations 40, no. 1 (2015): 1–18. 
125 Boraman, ‘Merging Politics with Economics,’ 77.
126 Dylan Taylor and Sandra Grey, ‘From Class-Struggle to Neoliberal Narratives: 
Redistributive Movements in Aotearoa/New Zealand,’ New Zealand Sociology 29, no. 
3 (2014): 69–89.
127 Locke, Workers in the Margins.
107
was able to find expression in existing organisations, one of the reasons, 
perhaps, why the riot has not become more pronounced in this country.
The unemployed workers movement
Those who were hit hardest by the economic depression of the 1970s 
managed to organise relatively effectively in the 1980s. As Locke writes:
When depression hit in the 1970s, certain sections of the workforce—
women, Māori, Pasifika, young, unskilled and semi-skilled workers—bore 
the brunt of layoffs and reduced hours. It was these marginalised workers, 
with the assistance of the trade unions worst affected by the depression, 
who forged their own grassroots centres and unions for unemployed 
workers; they publicised growing unemployment and attacked the ‘dole 
bludger’ [stereotype] promulgated by the National Government.128 
By 1983 there were 28 unemployed and beneficiary groups in the country. 
The support and tie-in with the union movement faltered once the Fourth 
Labour Government came to power. Both the CSU and the FoL ‘changed 
their political strategy to one of nonconfrontation and uncensorious 
support of the Labour Government’—which included the end of support 
for an independent unemployed movement.129 The national body Te Roopu 
Rawakore o Aotearoa—in its literal translation, a movement of people who 
had nothing—was formed in 1985.130 The Māori protest movement and 
feminism were influential for Te Roopu members, ‘not only in their efforts 
to publicise and to resist institutional sexism and racism, but in the way 
non-hierarchical structures and democratic processes were used to build 
a grassroots movement that encouraged female and Māori leadership’.131 
Bringing a strong intersectional approach to organising the unemployed 
128 Locke, Workers in the Margins, 77.
129 Locke, ‘Blame the System, Not the Victim!’ International Labour and Working-
Class History 71 (Spring 2007): 170.
130 Locke, ‘Blame the System, Not the Victim!’
131 Locke, Workers in the Margins, 108.
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and beneficiary movement, activists in Aotearoa New Zealand were able to 
channel diverse currents of discontent into effective resistance—resistance 
that found expression in the People’s Centres opened in various locations 
around the country, where low-cost health-care and free advocacy services 
could be accessed by the poor and unemployed. And while the state reduced 
its welfare provision significantly over this period it still provided a limited 
safety-net for those hit hardest by the country’s economic downturn. 
The actions of Te Roopu helped slow the rollback of these services and 
supported those who needed to access them. Arguably, such organisation 
diffused the impulse to riot found elsewhere. 
Recent campaigns from within the union sector, like the Living Wage 
movement, the push for equal pay, union alliances with iwi to take on 
employers (as seen with the Iwi Leadership Forum actively supporting the 
Meatworkers Union in its actions against Talley’s in 2012), and the drive 
from unions like FIRST to organise labour-hire and migrant workers in 
recent years, can also be seen as countering the tendency to riot.  
In taking a broad-view of unionism in this country the following 
points can be made. While there is a strong tradition of militant unionism 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, the movement has tended toward conciliatory 
relations with capital and the state, largely because of the arbitration system 
and the close ties that developed between the Labour Party and union 
bodies like the FoL and CTU. Militant unionism, when it appeared, often 
met with violent repression. From the 1970s unionism in this country 
became increasingly intersectional in its outlook; however, over this same 
period it also faced fierce and sustained attacks from the capitalist class. 
The policies of the Fourth Labour Government and the Fourth National 
Government hollowed out the union movement. Since the ECA, unions 
have generally followed either the partnership approach or SMU.
The approach pursued by the unemployed workers and beneficiaries’ 
movement in the 1980s, and SMU more recently, suggests that the 
organisational path remains more attractive for the economically 
marginalised than the riot. But despite the recent uptick in strike activity 
and the work of campaigns like the Living Wage movement, the current 
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outlook is bleak. Only one organisation, Auckland Action Against Poverty, 
occupies the space left by this movement; Te Roopu dissolved in the 1990s; 
the People’s Centres are gone; union membership is at an historic low; and 
inequality is pronounced. In taking a broad view of the situation in this 
country, the strike (and union organisation) has been far more prevalent than 
the riot. However, while the conditions fuelling contemporary riots have not 
been as marked here as elsewhere, the current situation is such that rioting 
may yet become a prominent dimension of resistance in this country. 
Future riots?
As argued earlier, some correlations can be found between the situation 
in this country and those identified by Clover as fuelling contemporary 
riots in Western societies. The Queen Street Riot of 1984 can be explained, 
in part, by Clover’s theorisation—it was primarily the result of economic 
depression and racialisation. Yet, overall, it appears the riot does not present 
the same set of potentialities (if we are to view it this way) here as elsewhere. 
This is arguably due to different racial dynamics in this country and the 
organisational approaches deployed by the country’s most precarious 
workers and communities.132
It may also be that the occupation takes the place of the riot in this 
country. For Māori one of the principal objects of struggle has been 
reclaiming land lost through colonisation. As Harris notes, occupation as 
a means of drawing attention to grievances around land has been a long-
standing tactic for Māori—the 1877 occupation of a sheep station in 
Ōmārama by Ngāi Tahu is an early example.133 
As with strikes, there have been waves of occupations. Along with the 
Hīkoi, this tactic came to the forefront of Māori politics in the 1970s, 
a prominent example being the occupation of Ōrākei (Bastion Point) by 
132 The discussion here is limited to Māori and Pasifika, due to the relatively 
large amount of material available on these populations. A fuller treatment of racial 
dynamics in this country falls outside the scope of this article.
133 Harris, Hīkoi.
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Ngāti Whātua and supporters in 1977. It held for 506 days before 600 
army and police forcefully evicted it. Māori resistance during the Fourth 
National Government became particularly intense following revelations that 
the government sought to impose a one-billion-dollar ‘fiscal envelope’ on 
Treaty settlements. Waitangi Day in 1995 witnessed 500 Māori protestors 
engaging in a ‘full scale battle with police’.134 Another wave of occupations 
followed, including the 80-day occupation of Pākaitore by Whanganui 
iwi.135 A contemporary example is the SOUL (Save Our Unique Land) 
occupation, which seeks to save land confiscated by the Crown in 1863 
at Ihumātao from high-priced housing development.136 Whether this 
occupation signals the start of another wave remains to be seen.
Arguably, the logic of the commune grounds such occupations. The 
occupation enables, albeit temporarily and precariously, a life other than 
that dictated by capital. It stands opposed to the atomised culture fostered 
by colonisation.137 The communal logic of the occupation harbours 
emancipatory potential. It is frequently informed by the values of the 
Marae and is often a reclamation of the site of a previous marae to be re-
founded through the act of occupation. 
Might it be, though, that the riot is already with us as a ‘modality of 
life’ for some sections of the ‘surplus population’ in Aotearoa New Zealand? 
South Auckland presents a ready example of a location that is host to the 
dynamics of the contemporary riot: racialisation, relative poverty, status 
frustration, punitive state actions. It should be noted that in turning to this 
example I do so as external observer, offering only a partial, fragmentary, 
and no doubt distorted view.138  
South Auckland’s population haunts the white psyche as a latent 
134 Boraman, ‘The Myth of Passivity,’ 12.
135 Harris, Hīkoi.
136 Tim McCreanor, Frances Hancock, and Nicola Short, ‘The Mounting Crisis at 
Ihumaatao,’ Counterfutures 6 (2016): 139–148.
137 Boraman, ‘The Myth of Passivity.’
138 To offset my own positionality, I rely on the work of Māori and Pasifika scholars 
to develop this discussion.
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threat.139 Negative stereotypes of this population surface regularly in 
national media.140 As Hook notes, ‘There is a perception held by the 
general public that Māori and Pacific Islanders are responsible for most 
of the crimes perpetrated on the streets of New Zealand as well as in the 
homes today’.141 South Auckland presents the threat, in the minds of the 
‘average Kiwi’, of a population teetering perpetually on the brink of crime 
and violence, a prominent recent example being coverage of Pasifika rugby 
league fans during the 2017 Rugby League World Cup. As Wall reports, 
‘Many people have voiced concerns about the portrayal of Tongan and 
Pacific Island supporters in the media, which they feel has exacerbated the 
police response’.142 The police were aggressive. In the wake of the Tonga–
England match police snatched flags from Tonga supporters and smashed 
the poles on the pretext these could be used as weapons. An Ōtahuhu 
resident describes her reaction to the police response: 
It felt like they were in a riot mode. They definitely wanted their presence to 
be felt in a really assertive way. Their presence was aggressive and [it] didn’t feel 
like they were there to support the energy, which was really disappointing.143 
These suburbs are sites of racialised poverty, with Māori and Pasifika 
disproportionately bearing the negative outcomes of the country’s changing 
139 Alex Latu and Albany Lucas, ‘Discretion in the New Zealand Criminal Justice 
System: The Position of Maori and Pacific Islanders,’ Journal of South Pacific Law 12, 
no. 1 (2008): 84–93
140 Jean Allen and Toni Bruce, ‘Constructing the Other: News Media 
Representations of a Predominantly “Brown” Community in New Zealand,’ Pacific 
Journalism Review 23, no. 1 (2017): 225–244. Tim McCreanor et al, ‘The Association 
of Crime Stories and Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand Print Media,’ Sites 11, no. 1 
(2014): 121–144.
141 Hook, ‘The Criminalization of Māori and Pacific Islanders,’ 3.
142 Jamie Wall, ‘“It felt like they were in a riot mode”: Police tactics turn ugly in 
Otāhuhu,’ The Spinoff, 26 November 2017, https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/26-11-2017/
it-felt-like-they-were-in-a-riot-mode-police-tactics-turn-ugly-in-otahuhu/
143 Wall, ‘“It Felt Like They Were in a Riot Mode.”’
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economic fortunes.144 Mila suggests that ‘Pacific peoples are an almost 
“textbook” example of an ethnic minority experiencing significant and 
enduring inequality: indeed, a Pacific person living in New Zealand is 2.6 
times more likely than the average person to be living in poverty’.145 This 
weighs heavily on youth:
young [Pacific] people have to contend with the hardest lesson that the 
labour market has to teach: that the ability to supply labour does not 
mean that you are in demand. This group has been described as ‘the lost 
generation’: bright, eager—and unwanted; and no groups are as unwanted 
as Pacific and Māori young people.146 
As economic opportunity recedes, the punitive dimension of the state 
becomes more pronounced. Work and Income, the government department 
tasked with administering benefits, presents one face of the punitive state, 
increasingly oriented as it is towards punishing the poor and blaming them 
‘for the poverty they have no part in creating’.147 Law and order is another 
face of the punitive state, and suburbs with high concentrations of Māori 
and Pasifika are subject to discriminatory police practices and high rates of 
incarceration.148 
The negative stereotypes projected onto South Auckland’s Māori and 
144 Counties Manakau Health, Demographic Profile: 2013 Census, Population of 
Counties Manukau (Auckland: Counties Manukau Health, 2015).
145 Karlo Mila, ‘Only One Deck,’ in Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis, ed. Max 
Rashbrooke (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2013), 91.
146 Mila, ‘Only One Deck,’ 99. See also: Damon Salesa, Island Time: New Zealand’s 
Pacific Futures (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2018).
147 Auckland Action Against Poverty, ‘Not Enough Left: Beneficiaries speak on 
their visions for welfare, work and housing,’ Auckland Action Against Poverty, https://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aaap/pages/28/attachments/original/1505687996/
Not_Enough_Left_demand_document.pdf?1505687996
148 Webb, ‘Māori, Pacific Peoples and the Social Construction of Crime Statistics’; 
Latu and Lucas, ‘Discretion in the New Zealand Criminal Justice System’; Kim 
Workman and Tracey McIntosh, ‘Māori and Prison,’ in The Palgrave Handbook of 
Australian and New Zealand Criminology, Crime and Justice, ed. Antje Deckert and 
Rick Sarre (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 725–735.
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Pasifika residents, alongside discriminatory policing and disproportionately 
high rates of economic inequality, presents a set of features that map onto 
Clover’s discussion of the contemporary riot as a ‘modality of life’. As 
elsewhere there is a chance this could take spectacular form again—Queen 
Street riot 2.0. That this tendency is not apparent at this point, however, 
signals that existing forms of community-belonging and organisation are 
effective for these populations despite adverse external conditions.149 
A final consideration might be the geography of Auckland as a city. 
Bradford offers the following observations from a ‘Left activist perspective’ 
in the 1980s and 1990s: 
We didn’t see riots or angry demonstrations erupting in the south of 
Auckland. The ‘enemy’ of unemployed and low paid workers, the hyper-
rich, were seen to be located in the CBD headquarters of banks and big 
companies, the stock exchange, Queen St, and the rich suburbs close to 
town (e.g. Parnell, Remuera, Herne Bay—Ponsonby and Grey Lynn can 
be added to this now). People tended to come into Queen St for rallies, 
demos and the music events that in one case led to the Queen St riot in 84. 
. . . I guess the main times vibrant action has occurred away from the city 
was during anti-apartheid and other specific campaigns where key targets 
were elsewhere. In other words, South Auckland lacked targets for rage, 
comparatively speaking.150
Further, Aotearoa New Zealand does not have the same degree of 
urban housing intensification of racialised and relatively-disadvantaged 
populations as seen in other countries. It may be that Aotearoa New 
Zealand is too suburbanised to encourage rioting.  
149 Further, Salesa argues that Pasifika—including those in South Auckland—
continue to effectively influence unions and Labour Party policy: Salesa, Island Time: 
New Zealand’s Pacific Futures.
150 Sue Bradford, e-mail message to author, 12 March 2019.
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Conclusion
The radical Left in Aotearoa New Zealand is confronted with the challenge 
of envisioning how to effectively realise substantive positive change. Class, 
party, and union no longer provide positions of organisational strength, 
which is not to say that they cannot do so once again.151 Inequality is 
pronounced, precariousness widespread, and increasingly large proportions 
of the population are deemed surplus to requirements by capital—an 
exclusionary process with a racialised dimension. It is within such a context 
that some Left theorists have identified the riot as an increasingly prevalent 
form of resistance. 
While patterns of labour militancy and decline in Aotearoa New 
Zealand are broadly consistent with other Western countries—excepting 
the mid-19th century when the colony was in its infancy—the dynamics 
of the riot differ. While there is some cross-over with the period of 
contemporary riots presented by Clover, it would appear that organisations 
on the Left were able to somewhat constructively address issues of race 
and class together—as was notably the case with Te Roopu Rawakore o 
Aotearoa. However, this did not happen in the context of a strong Left, 
with the Left on the back-foot after the Labour Party’s neoliberal reforms.
That the riot has not become more pronounced in the neoliberal 
period—despite increasing levels of inequality and the hollowing out of 
unions—suggests that existing forms of organisation are adequate for 
the time being. For instance, traditional forms of Māori resistance, such 
as occupation, continue to prove durable and effective. This accounts, 
in part, for why the racialised dimension commonly identified with the 
contemporary riot has not been more pronounced here. However, to the 
external observer at least, Clover’s expanded view of the riot as a ‘modality 
of life’ appears to have some saliency when considering the interplay of 
race and ethnicity, discriminatory policing practices, and pronounced and 
151 I have argued elsewhere as to the continued relevance of the party for 
organisation on the Left: Dylan Taylor, ‘Movements, Party, State,’ in New Forms of 
Political Organisation, ed. Campbell Jones and Shannon Walsh (Auckland: Economic 
and Social Research Aotearoa, 2018), 58–67. 
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enduring economic inequality in areas like South Auckland. That the riot 
has not increased in frequency and intensity in such areas may be due 
to the suburban nature of Aotearoa New Zealand’s cities, or because of 
the effective networks of community organisation and support. Further 
research is required if firm conclusions are to be drawn here. 
While the riot is not a pronounced feature of the social landscape 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, identifying riots as potential sites of political 
possibility and understanding the wider structural dynamics in which they 
emerge is a productive exercise. It goes beyond the shallow denunciations of 
riots that commonly appear in the popular press. Such denunciations tend 
to harbour racial and class prejudices. The riot is political and deserves to 
be understood as such. That said, to await the riot, in the hope it will open 
onto an emancipatory political sequence, is a futile position for the Left 
to assume. Considerations of the riot provide one means of mapping the 
unclear terrain of class, capital, and contestation today. But such mapping 
is only useful if it is accompanied by organisation on the terrain revealed.
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